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Executive summary
In Kenya, informal milk markets account for approximately 86% of milk supplies to 
consumers and its supply-chain-related actors include small-scale producers, mobile milk 
traders, milk bar operators and milk transporters. The demand for milk and milk products is 
also on the rise in Kenya where annual per capita milk consumption is now estimated at 145 
litres, which is believed to be more than five times higher than milk consumption in other 
countries in East Africa. Additional research and a review of secondary data have shown that 
dairy products constitute the largest food expenditure item in Kenyan households.
Although most milk in Kenya passes through informal market channels, previous government 
policies did not adequately address the concerns of the farmers, traders and consumers who 
make up these channels. The informal milk markets dominate because milk sold through 
informal markets reaches and satisfies the traditional tastes of poor consumers who pay a 
lower price for it and farmers receive higher prices than they do via the formal sector. The old 
colonial dairy policy, which essentially criminalized the activities of small-scale milk vendors 
(SSMVs), was largely designed to protect the interests of large-scale settler dairy producers 
and professed to be based on concerns about food safety and quality. Prior to a recent 
policy change in 2004, small-scale dairy producers and traders were often harassed as large, 
powerful dairy market players, linked to those in authority, sought to increase their relatively 
small market share. The activities of SSMVs were not recognized and they could not trade 
unless licensed, yet the existing regulations made no provisions for licensing or engaging 
them. The main regulatory body, the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB), perceived its mandate as one 
to stamp out small-scale marketing channels. Regulations in effect only recognized a western 
industrial model of processing and packaging of milk, and small-scale milk producers were 
required to act only as suppliers.
Efforts to revise the old Kenya dairy policy were spearheaded by the Smallholder Dairy 
Project (SDP), a collaboratively implemented, integrated livestock research and development 
project whose broad objectives were twofold. First, the initial research phase focused 
on identifying best-bet technologies aimed at improving livestock farming practices and 
livelihoods. The second phase of SDP initiated and implemented strategies to influence 
and enhance changes in the Kenyan dairy policy, particularly those that did not officially 
recognize the existence or operations of SSMVs. The revised policy would allow KDB to 
engage SSMVs through training and licensing as well as milk promotion. SDP officially 
commenced in 1997 and ceased its activities by 2005. 
This study is an ex post assessment of the impact of the revised Kenya dairy policy. It 
outlines the policy change process, investigates induced behavioural changes at the levels 
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of field regulators and SSMVs, and estimates economic impacts on producers, SSMVs and 
consumers. It also provides a strategic assessment of the research and coordinating roles 
played by ILRI, recognizing that ILRI was only one partner in a complex project with many 
people and organizations involved, and estimates how much of the overall gains can be 
attributed to this research/coordination component. 
SDP research provided evidence supporting policy and institutional reforms in the Kenyan 
dairy sector. Specific research evidence included (1) the large number of smallholder 
households which depended on dairying for their livelihoods; (2) the large proportion of the 
milk sector that is dominated by the informal market; and (3) the significant employment 
creation potential of the informal sector. In different forums that included workshops, 
seminars, other conferences and meetings with policymakers, SDP advocacy partners 
used the above-mentioned research outputs to influence policy, with the current changes 
significantly effected in September 2004 when subsidiary legislation was published to enable 
training and licensing of SSMVs.
This study found that SDP produced a significant volume of evidence that was used 
to influence the policy change process at various stages by different decision-makers 
and organizations. Although the Kenyan dairy policy document and bill have been in a 
parliamentary process for more than a decade, written ministerial subsidiary regulation 
plus KDB reorganization provides ample regulatory authority for engaging SSMVs and this 
significant shift in dairy regulation was traced back to September 2004. The study found 
significant evidence of behavioural change among regulators and SSMVs that has led to 
positive economic benefits across Kenya.
Results show that overall, milk marketing margins declined by 9%—equivalent to 0.54 Kenya 
shillings (KES) per litre (KES 65 = USD 1.00)—when the revised policy came into effect, 
reflecting reduced costs in the supply chain. However, this post-policy marketing margin 
change was only statistically significant in the Nairobi area and was not statistically different 
from the pre-policy change marketing margin in areas outside of the Nairobi area markets. 
Still, a significant number of SSMVs are now operating under licence.
Welfare benefits arising from the policy change were high, and are captured by consumers, 
producers, and SSMVs. A cost–benefit analysis revealed that the policy change was highly 
profitable, with a high positive net present value (NPV) and all costs being recouped quite 
quickly. In addition, the very high internal rate of return (IRR) value suggests that positive 
net benefits will continue to be gained by many actors in the dairy sector for years to come. 
However, government must devise a fairer way of assessing cess fees among producers, 
consumers. A process of assessing a significant portion at the level of SSMVs may lead to 
losses among SSMVs, in spite of the policy change.
11 Introduction
1.1 Study background
In Kenya, informal milk markets account for nearly 86% of milk supplies to consumers 
(Omore et al. 2004). The supply chain actors in these markets include small-scale producers, 
mobile milk traders, milk bar operators and milk transporters. This dominance of SSMVs in 
Kenya is also seen in neighbouring countries, such as Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, and in 
many other developing countries, including India, which is now the largest dairy producer in 
the world.
There are also indications of increasing demand for milk and dairy products in these 
developing countries. For example, annual per capita milk consumption in Kenya is now 
estimated at 145 litres1 (SDP 2005) and is believed to be more than five times higher than 
milk consumption in other countries in East Africa. In addition, research by Argwings-Kodhek 
et al. (2005) and a review of secondary data by Salasya et al. (2006) determined that dairy 
products constitute the largest item of food expenditure by Kenyan households.
Although most milk in Kenya passes through informal market channels, previous government 
policies did not adequately address the concerns of the farmers, traders and consumers 
who operate in these channels. Milk sold through informal markets reaches and satisfies 
the traditional tastes of poor consumers, and farmers receive higher prices than they do 
via the formal sector (Omore et al. 2004). The old colonial dairy policy, which essentially 
criminalized the activities of SSMVs, was largely designed to protect the interests of large-
scale settler dairy producers and professed to be based on concerns about food safety and 
quality. Prior to a recent policy change in 2004 that is the focus of this study, small-scale 
dairy producers and traders were often harassed as large, powerful dairy market players 
linked to those in authority sought to increase their relatively small market share. The 
activities of SSMVs were not recognized and they could not trade unless licensed, yet the 
existing regulations made no provisions for licensing or engaging them. The main regulatory 
body, KDB, also served as the main enforcement body with a perceived mandate to stamp 
out small-scale marketing channels. Regulations in effect only recognized a western 
industrial model of processing and packaging of milk, and small-scale milk producers were 
required to act only as suppliers.
The revised 2004 Kenya dairy policy allowed KDB to engage SSMVs through training and 
licensing as well as milk promotion. It was informed by the research and development 
1. This recently generated figure was obtained from sample-based surveys and groundtruthing in several 
locations; it is considered more accurate and is increasingly being used instead of other lower figures that are 
widely considered under-estimates, given that they are based on figures that were not updated.
2activities of the SDP, a collaboratively implemented, integrated livestock research and 
development project whose broad objectives were twofold. First, the initial research phase 
focused on identifying best-bet technologies aimed at improving livestock farming practices 
and livelihoods. The second phase of SDP initiated and implemented strategies to influence 
and enhance changes in the Kenyan dairy policy, particularly those that did not officially 
recognize the existence or operations of SSMVs. Legalization of the activities of SSMVs 
in Kenya raised awareness about the potential benefits of legalization elsewhere in East 
Africa, such that in 2007 Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda signed a memorandum of 
understanding to standardize and harmonize their dairy policies.
The SDP was implemented by ILRI, the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and the 
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MoLFD) and funded by the Department for 
International Development (DFID). Other key partners included Kenya Bureau of Standards 
(KEBS) and Ministry of Health officials, along with livestock farmers, SSMVs, milk processors 
and packagers from the private sector, and Action Aid, Institute of Policy Analysis and 
Research and SITE Enterprise Promotion from the civil society sector. Another key partner was 
Land o’Lakes, an international development organization whose mission includes promoting 
the activities of SSMVs. The project manager was an employee of MoLFD.   
For SSMVs operating in local markets, milk trade channels were severely limited by non-
tariff trade barriers and high transaction costs. SDP research and development activities were 
designed to inform a new dairy policy that engaged and recognized the activities of SSMVs 
and lowered market entry barriers through training and licensing. The effect of the new policy 
was to lower transaction costs and to reduce overall costs of marketing services, particularly 
to poor dairy producers and consumers.
This ex post assessment of the impact of the revised Kenya dairy policy outlines the policy 
change process, investigates induced behavioural changes at the levels of field regulators 
and SSMVs, and estimates economic impacts on producers, SSMVs and consumers. It 
also provides a strategic assessment of the research and coordinating roles played by ILRI, 
recognizing that ILRI was only one partner in a complex project with many people and 
organizations involved, and estimates how much of the overall gains can be attributed to this 
research/coordination component.
A number of previous research studies have quantified and evaluated the distribution of 
benefits deriving from POR (Lindner and Jarrett 1978; Freebairn et al. 1982; Wohlgenant 
1993; Ryan 1999), but there is a dearth of information on such studies within the CGIAR. 
As donors continue to invest in research aimed at having policy impact through the CGIAR, 
there is little evidence of effectiveness of POR or indeed any impact assessments of POR 
by CGIAR institutions. This makes it difficult to gauge not only the net benefits of POR, but 
3also the respective centres’ contributions to the policy change process. This evaluation of 
the impact of a revised Kenyan dairy policy that was an outcome of an ILRI-led dairy policy 
research project was commissioned by SPIA, an arm of the Science Council of the CGIAR, in 
an effort to contribute to this knowledge gap.
1.2 Objectives of the study
This study was designed to evaluate the impact of a revised Kenyan dairy policy that 
encouraged relevant government agencies to engage with SSMVs and, in particular, to 
explore and analyse the role that research/coordination played in contributing to the policy 
change and the net benefits to the investment in the policy research component.
Specific objectives were to: 
Describe and better understand the policy, institutional (in the broad sense of ‘rules •	
of the game’) and behavioural changes that have occurred in Kenya’s dairy sector and 
to identify and learn lessons about how they occurred and what role the research and 
coordination component of SDP played.
Quantify transaction costs and evaluate how reduced transaction costs have impacted •	
the prices paid by consumers and those received by producers.
Measure the overall economic benefits of the policy change to consumers, producers •	
and SSMVs.
Present a counterfactual situation, depicting what might have happened if SDP had •	
not been implemented and the dairy policy had not changed.
1.3 Outline of study methods
The study used a combined approach to assess both the influence of the research on policy 
change and to estimate the economic impact of the policy change. In doing this, it described 
the whole pathway from research to economic impacts on ultimate beneficiaries (Figure 
1). SDP’s process of learning lessons is described in detail in Leksmono et al. (2006) and is 
therefore only summarized in this assessment.
The approach combines both demand-led and supply-led elements to analyse what 
influenced changes in policy and behaviour, i.e. tracking back from the policy change to 
explore and document the influences of SDP in Kenya. The economic impact component is 
supply-led in that it models the impacts of the changes in policy on farm and retail prices, as 
well as on the economic welfare of farmers, SSMVs, consumers and input suppliers. The list 
of actors follows from SDP assessments (Omore et al. 2004) which determined that the milk 
supply chain in the informal sector is dominated by small-scale producers, SSMVs (including 
milk bars) and consumers.
4Figure 1. Pathway of research outputs to impacts.
1.4 Study area, data sources and sampling framework
The study benefited from the use of historical weekly urban wholesale data that had been 
collected for unprocessed (farm proxy) and processed (retail proxy) milk prices in Nairobi 
and Nakuru from August 2003 to February 2007 by the Kenya Dairy Development Project 
(with funding from Heifer International). As the policy and behavioural changes occurred 
during this time period, we were able to investigate the response of producer and consumer 
prices to the policy change.
Field interviews were conducted in the Nairobi area and Nakuru in August 2007 with a 
sample of 61 milk traders (30 from Nairobi and 31 from Nakuru) and 5 field regulators (3 
from Nairobi and 2 from Nakuru). In addition, we interviewed several policymakers and SDP 
researchers, including a KDB Technical Services Manager, an assistant to the KDB Technical 
Services Manager, the Chief Executive of SITE Enterprise Promotion, a former SDP Project 
Manager with MoLFD and two researchers from ILRI. The field interviews were conducted 
by an ILRI researcher and consultant experienced in dairy sector regulation and familiar with 
SDP. The interviews with milk traders and field regulators were conducted between 1 and 
10 August 2007. The interviews with policymakers and SDP researchers were conducted by 
three ILRI researchers in June and July 2007 and additional information solicited in January 
2008.
The interviews focused on the policy change process as reported by policy officials and 
associated behavioural changes among field regulators and milk traders. Information 
obtained through a review of relevant grey literature was supplemented by interviews of 
policy officials to provide an overview of the policy change process as well as the associated 
timeline for this process.









5Because this ex post impact assessment had limited time and funds available, the study 
was limited to Nairobi and Nakuru but included Kiambu and Thika towns on the outskirts 
of Nairobi. The study areas have always had KDB offices and operations. Aside from the 
police who were tasked under the Dairy Industry Act to act as field-level regulators, most 
recognized market locations where SSMVs operate have at least one field regulator from the 
Public Health Department and one from KDB. In addition, KDB is now spearheading training 
and licensing efforts in these areas, so that the impact of the new policy is more easily 
identified in these areas than elsewhere.
1.4.1 Description of the study area
Nairobi is a high milk density area where the dairy sector is dominated by small-scale milk 
producers. The area has a large collection of different trader groups with some, particularly 
transporters and mobile traders, coming from as far as 100 km away. The Thika area supplies 
parts of Nairobi and Machakos and is dominated by milk bars and small-scale mobile 
traders. These traders supply a competitive, urban and relatively sophisticated market. Milk 
is collected in the morning before 0600 hours and transported by public vehicles, arriving 
at the market by 0900 hours. Some of the traders act as middlemen, selling their milk to 
other traders who then transport their consignment to the market. Women constitute a large 
proportion of small-scale milk traders serving the Nairobi market.
Nakuru, on the other hand, is surrounded by large-scale farmers who deliver their milk 
directly to processors. Small-scale milk traders are left to collect milk from as far as 40 
km away from town. The area is dominated by small-scale mobile traders and milk bars. 
Small-scale mobile traders transport milk using bicycles and hence milk trade in this area is 
dominated by men.
1.4.2 Sampling SSMVs
The choice of sample size for SSMVs interviewed was not based on statistical principles 
but on a desire to collect information from as many traders as possible given constraints of 
time and funds. Similarly, the choice of interviewees was not statistically random. Using 
a questionnaire that served more like a checklist (see Appendix 1), SSMVs from Nairobi 
and Nakuru were individually engaged in interviews and informal discussions. No prior 
appointments were made with the traders; they were interviewed as they were encountered 
going about routine milk marketing operations. The interviews were conducted by the ILRI 
researcher and consultant mentioned in Section 1.4. Inclusive of travel time, the surveys were 
conducted from 1 to 10 August 2007.
61.5 Organization of the report
The introductory section highlights the research problem, study objectives and a broad 
outline of the study methodologies. In Section 2, summary reviews of SDP research and 
advocacy activities are presented in order to offer a clearer picture of the POR inputs 
and outputs. Section 3 presents outlines of the pre- and post-policy change regulatory 
environments illustrating the policy change and influence processes. Section 4 covers 
policy impacts on milk prices and behavioural changes among regulators and SSMVs. In 
the penultimate section, we present an economic impact assessment of the new Kenyan 
dairy policy and the net benefits to the research and coordination component as well as a 
counterfactual assessment—what would have happened without SDP and the resultant SDP-
inspired policy change. Finally, we present lessons learned and conclusions.
72 Policy-oriented research inputs and outputs  
in SDP
From 1988 to 1994, ILRI led an integrated research–extension–farmer collaboration project 
that was designed to identify and resolve problems encountered by smallholder dairy farmers 
in the Coastal region of Kenya. When SDP was at the conception phase, research ideas 
included expanding results and lessons learned such as systems for supplying milk into the 
highlands and greater Nairobi area (Leksmono et al. 2006). To generate research ideas and 
concretize objectives for a new dairy project that would be implemented by MoLFD, KARI 
and ILRI, the UK Overseas Development Administration (now DFID) sponsored a workshop 
for dairy industry stakeholders in March 1995. DFID subsequently approved funding for what 
would become SDP in December 1995.
SDP officially commenced in August 1997 as an integrated, collaborative research and 
development initiative whose purpose was to support the sustainable development of the 
smallholder dairy subsector in Kenya. The research phase proposed to undertake a detailed 
characterization of the informal milk sector, including an analysis of the policy environment 
and an examination of factors that hinder the competitiveness of smallholder dairy farmers. 
Initially, the project focused on participatory development of improved technologies and 
extension and training materials for farmers and traders, together with a spatial analysis of 
dairy systems for improved targeting. However, the focus later shifted towards supporting 
change in the policy and institutional environment in order to better support dairy-dependent 
livelihoods.
2.1 Research, advocacy and POR inputs in SDP
During the initial research phase of SDP (1997–2000), a rapid appraisal of dairy production 
systems was conducted in mid 1998 followed by an economic and structural analysis of 
dairying which also addressed policy and institutional issues related to dairy development 
in Kenya. These analyses provided dairy stakeholders with a comprehensive overview of 
affairs of the Kenyan dairy sector at that time, placing the project in an informed position to 
contribute to on-going discussions to influence changes in the Kenyan dairy policy. One of 
the major findings was that the informal milk sector was very important to the livelihoods of 
milk producers, traders and consumers.
Additional research activities in 1998 included structured household surveys in Kiambu 
District (close to Nairobi) and other districts in Kenya’s Central Province. The general 
objectives were (1) to describe the existing structure of dairy production and farmer practices; 
(2) assess existing and future constraints and opportunities facing the dairy industry and (3) 
8identify the types of dairy producers who should be targeted by SDP. The last objective was 
particularly significant for its attempt to identify resource-poor farmers who would be assisted 
by the project. Furthermore, between 1999 and 2000 SDP assessed public health hazards 
in the informal milk marketing sector. By the time the research phase was ending in 1999, 
it was clear that SDP activities so far omitted important aspects such as employment and 
livelihoods; these were later assessed.
The project further developed the characterizations and technologies and also focused on 
the uptake of those technologies with extended geographical coverage and a new goal of 
‘contributing to sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of poor people in Kenya’. The 
findings from these research activities were presented at many meetings throughout SDP’s 
lifetime. Following an in-depth review in 1999, the focus of the project changed to better 
address other aspects of dairy-related livelihoods, especially the outdated laws banning milk 
sales by SSMVs in urban areas of Kenya.
The final phase of SDP (2000–05) focused on policy-level outputs and more active 
engagement with policymakers. Following a ‘snapshot review’ in 2000 which reported 
favourably on SDP’s progress but noted that uptake of technologies at farm level was difficult 
in the prevailing policy environment, it was recommended that SDP develop a strategy for 
the reform of dairy policy using evidence-based SDP research findings in order to increase 
impact. SDP drew up a strategy for influencing policy, focusing in particular on the findings 
concerning the informal milk market, its importance for livelihoods and ways in which 
perceived public health risks could be addressed. The Kenyan dairy policy at that time did 
not directly prohibit the uptake of any smallholder farm-level technologies. However, it made 
farm-level production increases and quality improvement less palatable options because the 
policy prohibited milk sales through the informal sector into urban areas. It was clear that 
the prevailing policy environment was actively discouraging the predominant section of the 
market, with major implications for producers, traders and consumers whose livelihoods 
depended on this informal sector. To tackle some of the identified informal market issues, 
SDP piloted the training of SSMVs in basic milk testing, hygiene and handling.
Part of SDP’s policy-influencing strategy was to foster links with civil society organizations 
(CSOs) that could bring capacity to engage in policy advocacy in a way that the SDP 
implementing institutions could not. These CSOs became engaged in active advocacy in 
support of small-scale traders and farmers and, together with the KDB, were partners in 
SDP’s high-level dairy policy forum held in 2004 to present the project’s research results and 
highlight their policy implications.
DFID funded SDP to the tune of approximately USD 2.5 million from 1997 to 2005. 
Consultations with former SDP personnel revealed that the project’s research and 
9development partners contributed an additional USD 2.5 million in staff time, staff resources 
and other in-kind contributions over the life of the project. Actual staff time in hours was 
difficult to quantify but SDP had a project manager appointed by MoLFD, ILRI provided the 
technical research team and the CSOs were very active in the advocacy phase. A steering 
committee was established with members from ILRI, KARI, KDB, KEBS, MoLFD and the 
Ministry of Health and some informal market actors.
2.2 POR outputs and SDP research findings
This study reviewed SDP publications and research presentations between 1997 and 2005 
in order to provide a more concrete base to ascertain influence from POR outputs and 
research findings. The review revealed 10 SDP research reports, 38 conference presentations 
(including one poster), 9 extension papers (some additionally published in Kiswahili or 
Kikuyu), 4 journal publications, 10 policy briefs, 1 International Service for National 
Agricultural Research briefing paper and 1 doctoral and 2 masters theses. The documents 
covered several topics including farming systems and constraints; consumption, marketing 
and policy; production and utilization of feed resources; and institutional environment and 
dissemination of information. Although approximately half of all presentations were made 
in international forums outside of Kenya mostly by ILRI staff, it was impossible to estimate 
exactly how much staff time was allocated to this or any other dissemination process.
Generally, relevant SDP evidence supporting policy and institutional reform as gleaned from 
the above-mentioned publications and presentations includes the following facts: nearly 800 
thousand smallholder households depended on dairying for their livelihoods. At least 86% of 
marketed milk was sold through the informal sector as raw, unpasteurized milk. By extension, 
the vast majority of farmers and consumers depended on this market. The informal market 
paid significantly higher prices to farmers and sold milk to consumers at about half the price 
of processed, packaged milk. SDP also approximated the number of milk hawkers at 30 
thousand, the number of dairy cattle at 3 million, total milk production at 3 billion litres and 
annual per capita milk consumption at 100 litres per annum.
The above-mentioned statistics were widely used in Kenya and are reflected in official 
Government and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) statistics. 
However, in 2005 SDP recalculated these statistics using best available evidence. The new 
estimates put the number of smallholder dairy farms at 1.8 million, the number of milk 
hawkers at 39,650, the number of dairy cattle at 6.7 million, total annual milk production at 
4 billion litres and annual per-capita milk consumption at 145 litres (SDP 2005).
In addition, SDP investigated the employment creation potential of the informal milk 
sector. SDP determined that the informal sector accounted for a large proportion of jobs in 
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dairy marketing and processing and that in the larger economy, smallholder dairy farming 
also supported over 350 thousand full-time wage positions including employment in milk 
collection, transportation, processing, and sales. These findings on employment creation 
attracted the interest of government agencies and people involved in designing Kenya’s 
poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP), some of whom, as a result, would later become 
strong advocates for the legalization of SSMVs.
Overall, the findings on the highly significant farmer and consumer dependence on informal 
milk marketing and the employment generation potential, among others, proved crucial in 
influencing behavioural and policy change in the Kenyan dairy sector.
Kenyan consumers boil milk before they drink it—whether they purchase it raw or 
pasteurized—thereby significantly reducing public health concerns. SDP research results 
showed that processed milk from large-scale processors showed no significant difference 
in quality compared with milk from unlicensed traders—both were failing to meet quality 
standards that were set by KEBS. SDP research determined that training of small-scale traders 
in testing and handling of milk and use of appropriate containers led to improvements in milk 
quality.
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3 Policy influence pathway in SDP  
and the evolution of Kenya dairy policy environment
This section presents a review of the changes and timelines in the Kenyan dairy regulatory 
environment, together with the influences that were brought to bear on the policy change 
process. To understand the policy environment in which SSMVs operate, it is necessary to 
first chronicle the evolution of the dairy industry in Kenya due to successive government 
interventions. 
To assess policy influence, this section draws heavily from findings from a recent 
ILRI–Overseas Development Institute (ODI) study (Leksmono et al. 2006), grey literature 
and unpublished SDP documents, complemented by interviews with field regulators, 
policymakers and researchers. These approaches captured details not only of changes in 
written policies but also how technical information from SDP research was used to influence 
policymaking. It recounts events, activities, timelines and people present at each stage. 
3.1 Review of the pre-policy change regulatory environment
The policy of regulating the Kenyan dairy sector dates as far back as 1925 when Kenya 
Cooperative Creameries (KCC) was incorporated and charged with dairy processing and 
marketing responsibilities. Initially KCC operated in an environment that included other big 
processors. However, in 1968 its status as sole processor and distributor or marketer of milk 
was confirmed when the government withdrew operating licenses from other processors, 
supposedly wanting to rationalize milk distribution.
The business of regulating milk marketing fell to KDB which came into existence as decreed 
by the 1958 Dairy Industry Act. Although the Act was revised in 1984, it largely remains the 
main regulation that guides milk marketing activities in Kenya. The functions of KDB as spelt 
out in the Act are (1) to organize, regulate and develop the efficient production, marketing, 
distribution and supply of dairy produce, having regard to the various types of dairy produce 
required by different classes of consumers; (2) to improve the quality of dairy produce; 
(3) to secure reasonable and stable prices to producers of dairy produce; (4) to promote 
market research in relation to dairy produce; (5) to permit the greatest possible degree of 
private enterprise in the production, processing and sale of dairy produce, consistent with 
the efficiency of the producer and the interests of other producers and consumers and (6) 
generally to ensure, either by itself or in association with any government department or local 
authority, the adoption of measures and practices designed to promote greater efficiency in 
the dairy industry.
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The 1958 Act granted monopoly powers to KCC in purchasing, processing and marketing 
in scheduled areas, mainly urban markets which were the preserve of large-scale settler 
operations. From its establishment to the early 1970s, milk supplies to KCC by large 
producers alone were managed through contracts, quotas and minimum volumes. However, 
the 1964 Kibaki Commission recommended that contracted milk quotas be abolished and 
that KCC should accept milk from all producers, including SSMVs, as long as the quality 
was acceptable. As a result, KCC made guaranteed purchases of all milk supplied by all 
producers, irrespective of market demand. To accommodate these purchases, KCC needed to 
expand and did so extensively in the 1970s and 1980s.
Increased government expenditure on subsidized input services led to increased milk 
production and by 1977, smallholder milk production had overtaken large-scale production 
(Mbogoh and Ochuonyo 1992). KCC maintained its dominance in marketing and continued to 
experience rapid growth. By 1987, inefficient management led to untenable economic losses, 
paving the way for a government move to administer KCC under the Cooperatives Act and 
replace its board with a government-appointed one. In 1992, the dairy sector was liberalized 
with policy options that included price decontrols, liberalization of marketing, government 
budget rationalization, privatization and parastatal reform (Leksmono et al. 2006). That became 
justification for the government to restructure KCC to make it a profitable enterprise. Despite 
liberalization and restructuring, political interventions, inefficient management and political 
rent-seeking behaviour heralded the collapse of KCC as a state monopoly (monoposonist) in the 
1990s. Liberalization ended the government monopoly status of KCC and encouraged private-
sector participation through other large-scale processors. However, the official policy excluded 
participation by SSMVs except through sales to large-scale processors including the New 
KCC, a policy that was in prior existence. When SSMVs sold milk to consumers, especially in 
scheduled areas, it was considered illegal.
By the time of liberalization, KCC operated 11 collection centres and 11 processing facilities, 
employed 4000 people, handled 420 million litres of milk and produced 17 dairy products 
(MALDM 1993). However, the collapse of KCC in the lucrative, high-demand urban centres 
created a gap that was quickly filled by several large-scale, licensed and regulated private-
sector milk processors and packers and, in some cases, by small-scale unlicensed informal 
milk traders.
Before 1992, KCC as the government-supported monopoly on urban milk sales had 
pasteurized milk sales amounting to slightly over 200 million litres (Omore et al. 2004). 
At the time of the most recent SDP appraisal (see Omore et al. 2004), it was estimated that 
the formal sector accounted for about 14% of milk sales, representing 196 million litres. 
Besides the New KCC, other large-scale processors in the formal milk sector in Kenya include 
Brookside Dairies, Spin Knit Dairies, Githunguri Dairy and Adarsh Developers.
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3.2 Policy influence in the Kenyan dairy policy change process
In the previous section, we highlighted the timeline to the collapse of KCC as a government 
monopoly. As KCC gradually collapsed in a liberalized environment and its market share 
was taken over by other large licensed processors, a 1993 government document, the 
Kenya Dairy Development Policy, provided guidance on how to restructure and remain 
competitive. Yet, this was a policy environment that actively discouraged operations by 
SSMVs, even though by most accounts the 1958 Dairy Industry Act did not overtly proscribe 
their activities. There were speculations that the authority to regulate the informal sector 
derived from the Public Health Act of 1966, which specifically stated that the sale of milk 
products must be conducted at acceptable premises. Such confusions in applicable policy, 
the proliferation of SSMVs, the economic benefits of the informal dairy sector and other 
considerations galvanized the government to act in the policy arena. Consequently, in 
1996 the government set up the Dairy Industry Act review task force whose mandate was 
to propose amendments to the 1958 Act to reflect the liberalized policy environment in the 
dairy sector. This period coincided with the inception of SDP research activities, although at 
that time, the activities of the task force were independent of SDP. Among others, task force 
membership included personnel from KCC, KDB and MoLFD. Table 1 presents dates and a 
summary of important events and activities in the policy change process.
Revision of the 1958 Dairy Industry Act by the review taskforce focused on (1) organization 
and structure of the new KDB; (2) functions, powers and duties of the new KDB; (3) 
management and administration of the new KDB; (4) financial aspects of the new KDB; and 
(5) future steps and transition issues until KDB became fully autonomous and wholly funded 
through payment of cess fees by milk traders. 
The revised Dairy Industry Bill was available for stakeholder consultation by June 1996. This bill 
did not dwell on the role of SSMVs in retail markets. In the meantime, a subcommittee of the 
same task force was set up to revise the policy document. Although the draft bill was presented 
to the office of the Attorney General in 1996, critical personnel changes in the ministry delayed 
the reform process. By 1997, a draft of the revised policy document had also been prepared 
and was presented to the ministry policy committee in 1998. In 1999, the Ministry of Livestock 
accepted the revised policy document and in 2000, the revised draft bill. The two documents 
were harmonized in May 2000 and presented to the KDB and the Parliamentary Committee on 
Agriculture, Lands and Natural Resources in August/September 2000. In March 2001, following 
a request by the Parliamentary Committee, stakeholders were given another opportunity to revise 
the bill and policy document. The revised documents were resubmitted to the Parliamentary 
Committee later that year. Because 2002 was an election year, the bill and policy documents saw 
very little activity. In 2003, there was a new government in office and the revised bill and policy 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































By 2003, the policy advocacy phase of the SDP had become very active. The new 
government made some changes to the KDB, but by then, such vacillations had emboldened 
large-scale processors who were opposed to the new bill and policy. In addition to safety 
and quality issues addressed in the research phase, SDP arguments in favour of engaging 
SSMVs included the huge impact on employment creation and poverty reduction in the era 
of the PRSP. Paid advertisements were placed in local newspapers touting the benefits of 
legalization, but these were met with rebuttals in the same media by large-scale processors, 
culminating, by late 2003, in what became known as the ‘milk wars’. Arguments in favour 
of legalization which appeared in local media used research evidence (such as presented in 
Section 2.2) from SDP. In May 2004, SDP and partners organized a consultative dairy policy 
forum of stakeholders including ministers, members of parliament and other government 
officials, at which it was agreed in principle that the policy of engagement with SSMVs would 
be supported. Presentations at the forum included research findings that supported pro-poor 
policy reforms. In addition, SDP and partners officially launched policy briefs and screened a 
video entitled ‘Unheard voices from Kenya’s dairy industry’.
While the bill and policy change processes continued in parliament, ministerial authority 
allowed the Minster for Livestock and Fisheries Development, on the advice of the KDB, to 
issue a set of dairy industry regulations (Legal Notices 101, 102 and 103) in September 2004. 
While they were all updated versions of subsections of the revised 1958 Act, the most pertinent 
one was Legal Notice 102, also known as the Dairy Industry (Sales by Producers) Regulations, 
2004. These regulations streamlined the licence application processes and, more importantly, 
clearly enumerated the types of licences that were now available in the dairy sector (e.g. 
primary producer, processor, mini dairy, cottage industry, milk bar and cooling plant), some 
of which were clearly focused on activities that were compatible with small-scale informal 
operations. KDB officials used the impetus provided by the issuance of these regulations to 
engage and institute training, certification and licensing requirements for SSMVs.
Since the policy change, KDB has worked to train and certify SSMVs while licensing their 
milk outlets and premises which meet requirements on handling, hygiene and quality 
control. In addition, KDB has trained and employed the services of business development 
service (BDS) providers to train and certify SSMVs whose businesses would then be licensed 
by KDB. While progress is being made on these fronts, the number of BDS providers is still 
small relative to the number of SSMVs waiting to be trained, certified and licensed. Also, 
KDB is working with NGOs like SITE Enterprise Promotion to encourage milk consumption 
on the premise that quality is being greatly improved by training and licensing. KDB has 
started branding milk outlets and premises to improve consumer confidence and promote 
recognition by regulatory authorities. Evidence, though yet anecdotal, suggests that milk sales 
are increasing in these branded outlets and premises.
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4 Impact of new dairy policy on enforcement  
and compliance
Primary information to assess the impact of the new dairy policy on enforcement and 
compliance and changes in general attitudes and behaviour of both regulators and SSMVs 
was obtained from interviews with field regulators and SSMVs. In cases where the survey 
respondents were asked to provide information on the periods before and after the policy 
changes, the actual comparison referred to the days or weeks prior to September 2004 vs. 
July/August 2007. Additional insights were gleaned from interviews with policymakers and 
researchers. The information from the interviews was supplemented with information from 
grey literature and the ILRI–ODI study by Leksmono et al. (2006).
4.1 Behavioural change among field regulators
Around late 2004, field regulators instituted some changes in enforcement activities, 
following specific instructions from KDB and Public Health Department officials. Previous 
activities were limited to policing and inspection, usually checking for licences that were 
never issued. Nowadays, their task is to ensure that licensed outlets and premises operated 
by SSMVs meet conditions on milk hygiene and testing requirements, sanitation of premises 
and health status of SSMVs. They also provide advice on how to meet these conditions. 
In addition, some regulators issue milk movement permits to mobile traders and assist the 
licensing process by enabling relevant paperwork required from SSMVs; these activities are 
accomplished through field visits, spot checks and training. The skills required to bring about 
these changes have mostly been obtained through formal training over the last few years.
Some of the regulators have not strictly followed the new requirements or instructions. 
Reasons proffered include a need to adapt to local situations, but also that some of the 
requirements may be too expensive for some SSMVs. It is no surprise, therefore, that they 
believe that most trained and licensed traders do not strictly adhere to the requirements 
of the new regulations. Infractions include the continued use of plastic containers instead 
of aluminium ones, the use of unhygienic premises, excessive adulteration and illegal 
handling during transportation and distribution. While some regulators have routinely helped 
SSMVs to gradually comply with the requirements of the new regulation, others have meted 
punishments such as confiscating illegal containers and products, charging SSMVs to court 
and, in the most extreme cases, revoking licences.
Before the new policy, violations by untrained and unlicensed SSMVs were mostly punished 
by arrests and subsequent court appearances; now, unlicensed and untrained SSMVs may be 
offered advice on how to get training and licensing. Sometimes, the shortage of regulatory 
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staff means that the unlicensed and untrained SSMVs may actually be left to operate. 
Regulators do not accept that illegal payments such as political rents were rife before or after 
the policy change, but they suggest that legalization of the activities of SSMVs has made such 
payments even less likely.
KDB officials maintain that harassment was never a part of the regulatory policy and that 
these actions were perpetrated by over-zealous field agents who had little or no technical 
supervision. The new technical personnel at KDB are aware of the employment creation 
opportunities in the informal dairy sector and claim to be working to enable rather than stifle 
the sector.
4.2 Behavioural change among SSMVs
To assess behavioural change among SSMVs, a survey was conducted of 61 milk traders 
along the purposefully selected Central and Western milk market chain areas. The areas 
of Nairobi (including Nairobi, Thika and Kiambu) and Nakuru were selected because 
they represent scheduled trading areas with KDB offices and would therefore be directly 
influenced by the regulations.
4.3 Survey results
All the interviewed milk traders owned their operations, although there were milk bar 
operations established by groups of SSMVs. Most (82%) of the businesses were started in 
2004 or earlier, i.e. before the policy change, so most interviewed traders were familiar with 
the policy enforcement environment before and after the policy change.
Almost 50% of SSMVs interviewed were producer-traders, implying that their milk was 
sourced from their farms. The remainder were almost evenly divided among traders who 
were non-producers, transporter-traders and milk bar operators, with almost all their milk 
coming from other milk traders. Table 2 presents the distribution of SSMVs interviewed.











Mobile trader (producer) 48 100 47 100
Mobile trader (non-producer) 16 100 20 67
Transporter-trader 16 100 13 100
Milk bar 20 100 20 100
Total 100 100
Source: Survey data (2007).
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Almost all respondents were familiar with the new regulations or requirements on milk 
handling and quality control, and they used these guidelines or regulations in the conduct 
of their businesses. The specific regulatory requirements mentioned include training and 
licensing, types of containers used and hygiene. Many SSMVs received information on milk 
handling and quality control from KDB and, to a lesser extent, from ILRI and other SSMVs, 
mostly between 2005 and 2007. This was the period when KDB actively encouraged SSMVs 
to obtain training and to familiarize themselves with issues related to milk handling and 
quality control.
It is noteworthy that the surveys were conducted in areas where KDB operates. In the survey, 
approximately 85% of respondents reported that they had been trained on milk handling 
and quality control methods. However, only half of them reported applying and receiving 
operating licences immediately following training, implying a lag between training and 
licensing. The hiatus is not unusual, given that training and certification of SSMVs by BDS 
and KDB usually precede licensing of premises and outlets for milk sales. In reality, all but 
two SSMVs who were interviewed had one form of licence or another for their operations. 
The most common licences reported were milk bar licences (49%), milk movement permits 
(44%) and mini-dairy licences (15%), as presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Proportion of SSMVs reporting different types of licences
Type of licence % of Nairobi SSMVs % of Nakuru SSMVs % of all SSMVs
Milk bar licence 45 53 49
Mini-dairy licence 3 27 15
Milk movement permit 67 20 44
Medical/public health certificate 19 3 11
Business permit 6 3 5
Source: Survey data (2007).
The survey established that approximately 23% of all respondents had more than one 
operating licence. For example, a typical SSMV obtained milk movement permits which 
allowed milk to be transported to a licensed milk bar that is co-owned with other SSMVs. The 
latter issue also explains the apparently disproportionately high number of SSMVs reporting 
milk bar licences.
Consistent with the policy change timeline, most SSMVs were trained by KDB agents 
between 2005 and 2007. Nearly 90% of respondents reported that it was presently easier 
to obtain a license than in the period prior to 2004 when the new policy came into effect, 
noting that licensing is now being expedited following training and other requirements.
On average, SSMVs reported that before they were trained and licensed, they were harassed 
by KDB and other regulators about four times a month; the average frequency of harassment 
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was significantly higher in Nakuru (six times a month) than in Nairobi. Forty percent of 
respondents reported that they were last harassed by KDB or other regulators in 2005 or later. 
The most common form of harassment was by confiscation of milk, but nearly 10% of SSMVs 
reported bribing their way out of a potential arrest situation. Nearly all licensed SSMVs 
who had been in operation before the policy change reported a change in the behaviour of 
regulators toward them since licensing, noting that they were now allowed to operate as long 
as they complied significantly with all requirements. However, those whose premises and 
outlets were still not licensed were usually harassed by regulators, although to a lesser extent 
than before the policy change.
It is clear from the above that changes in behaviour among regulators and SSMVs were 
already underway before the legal notices were issued in September 2004, and these were 
reflected in changing views and opinions as a result of various pressures exerted by SDP 
influence.
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5 Economic impact of the new Kenyan dairy 
policy
The policy changes were expected to improve the welfare of producers, traders and 
consumers by reducing transaction costs and the retail milk price while increasing producer 
prices. Previously, SSMVs venturing into the retail market were likely to incur high 
transaction costs resulting from milk loss due to adverse police action, quality loss due to 
milk becoming sour and direct confiscation of milk and containers. However, those SSMVs 
who pay political rent may be able to avoid adverse police action as well as losses due to 
confiscation of milk and milk containers. Both options ultimately translated into higher 
consumer prices.
5.1 Policy impact on transaction costs:  
A model of equilibrium displacement
Transaction cost economics recognizes that there are costs to carrying out any exchange. These 
costs include information, negotiation and enforcement costs (Hobbs 1997). Certainly, several 
studies have shown that market participation by resource-poor smallholders is hindered by 
high transaction costs (Staal et al. 1997; Holloway et al. 2000). Implementation of the revised 
Kenya dairy policy reduced transaction costs and hence, marketing margins. Salasya et al. 
(2006) estimated the reduction in marketing margin at the SSMV level using the transaction 
cost approach; the estimate was 38% but its accuracy was questioned by some given the small 
sample size and the number and choice of transactions that were included in the analysis. 
Training and licensing also ensure the elimination of a non-tariff domestic trade barrier, leading 
to increased market access by small-scale milk traders. Additionally, KDB, the BDS providers 
and other NGO partners have actively engaged in milk promotion, although the overall effect 
is that consumers merely shift market preferences to licensed premises and outlets, increasing 
sales at those premises and outlets alone. This study investigated the distribution of gains arising 
from reduced transaction costs. The economic model evaluated the collective impact of the 
new policy through its effect on prices, quantities and overall welfare.
Several studies have used equilibrium displacement models to evaluate the distribution of gains 
from policy change (e.g. Freebairn et al. 1982; Wohlgenant 1993; Lusk and Anderson 2004). 
Consistent with the concepts and ideals implied in these studies, we proposed a model (see 
Figure 2) to estimate distributional changes in farm and retail prices, and changes in welfare. 
To better explain our model of equilibrium displacement following Freebairn et al. (1982), we 
extend Gardner’s (1988) program effects model to include the impact of a reduction in the cost 
of marketing goods and services in the Kenya dairy market (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Distribution of returns from implementing the new Kenyan dairy policy.
In its most simplistic form, the model assumes that the market is competitive, with linear 
demand and supply functions. The model also assumes that the supply of marketing goods 
and services is less than perfectly elastic, resulting in a normal supply curve for these goods 
and services. The model is appropriate because, as previously mentioned, most of the milk 
produced in the informal sector is sold raw and it is unlikely that aggregate economy-wide 

























high consumer demand for raw, unpasteurized milk, while processors who served the retail 
markets sold only processed milk; (2) SSMVs had the legal option of selling their milk to 
large licensed processors who pay less than consumers; (3) SSMVs could make political rent 
payments to avoid confiscation of milk and containers; (4) SSMVs could target retail markets 
in areas where there was little or no regulatory activity and (5) SSMVs could engage in 
limited production for retail market. Some of these options may also reduce losses in quality.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the impact of change in the Kenya dairy policy on welfare gains by 
consumers, producers and SSMVs who provide marketing goods and services. We posit a 
two-market scenario, a ‘retail’ market with demand for milk Dr and supply of marketing 
goods and services Sn, and a ‘farm-level’ market with derived demand for milk Df and supply 
of milk Sf. Note that derived demand Df is equivalent to Dr - Sn ∀Quantity where Dr - Sn > 0.
We define market margin, M, as the difference between Df and Dr (i.e. M = Dr - Df); we 
assume that it is not constant but generally comprises a fixed portion and a portion that 
varies with quantity. In the pre-policy change environment, Pr is the price of milk in the retail 
market, Pn is the cost of supplying marketing goods and services in the retail market, Pf is the 
farm price for milk and Q0 is the initial milk quantity that clears the market.
To demonstrate the impact of the policy change, consider that the new policy of legalizing 
the activities of SSMVs after training and licensing leads to a reduction in transaction costs 
or market margin arising from significantly lower political rent payments and milk losses. 
Consequently, there is a reduction in the cost of supplying milk and milk products to the 
retail market. This results in a downward shift in the supply curve for marketing goods and 
services and, consequently, a new derived demand curve arising from an upward shift. The 
proportional shift in derived demand reflects a reduction in the market margin, M, by a cost, 
w, which is measured as the vertical difference between the Df and Df
’. The resulting increase 
in quantity of milk supplied to the market, from Q0 to Q1, is also occasioned by an increase 
in the number of SSMVs now supplying the retail market. The markets also see decreases in 
retail milk price and the cost of supplying marketing goods and services, but also an increase 
in milk prices received by farmers. As a result, Figure 2 shows unequivocal increases in 
consumer surplus by the area Prmnr and producer surplus by the area Pfbcd whereas surplus 
accruing to SSMVs who supply milk and milk products to the market increases by the area 
efkl while losing the smaller Pngfh. These indicate that there are cost reduction benefits 
accruing to the market chain actors. In the case of SSMVs, reductions in margins accruing 
result from political rent that is no longer paid to regulators, and milk and milk containers 
that are no longer confiscated. The formulae for estimating the welfare changes are provided 
by Freebairn et al. (1982) and Wohlgenant (1993).
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Based on these, we present an analytical model following Freebairn et al. (1982). The 
competitive model of the post-policy change environment is presented as:
 rPQ 10 aa −=     (1)
 QwM 10 bb +−=     (2)
 MPP fr +=      (3)
 ( )if PPQ −++= xff 10     (4) and
 ,10 QP
i dyd +−=
    
(5)
where Q is the quantity of milk at the farm level (which clears the market at equilibrium), Pr 
is milk price in the retail market, Pf is milk price at the farm level, M is the retail farm price 
margin and Pi is the cost of non-farm input per unit farm output. In the model, cost reductions 
attributed to the new policy are represented as w to the SSMV. While policy change is 
directly related to cost reductions to the SSMV (in terms of reduced transaction costs), it 
is possible that indirect or secondary effects of policy change may include additional cost 
reductions to other actors, which we define as ξ to the farmer and ψ to the input supplier. 
The latter will be modelled as an additional exercise. In all cases, the overall effect is an 
increase in milk quantity. From the model above, equation (1) is the retail demand schedule, 
equation (2) is the SSMV schedule or market margin equation, equation (3) is the price link 
equation representing the retail farm price margin, equation (4) is the farm supply schedule 
and equation (5) is the input supply schedule. As previously mentioned, the market margin 
is not constant. Rather, it includes a fixed component and a component that varies with 
quantity. Algebraic solutions to the system of equations above (see Freebairn et al. (1982) 
for an intuitive insight into the derivations) are provided to estimate changes in surpluses to 
consumers, marketers, farmers and input suppliers, respectively, as: 
 HWCS /1f=∆     (6) 
 HWSSMVS /111 fab=∆    (7)
 HWPS /1a=∆     (8) and 
 HWISS /111 fad=∆     (9) 
 
where HhQhW 2/211fa+=  is aggregate welfare change, yx ++= wh  is aggregate 
cost reduced by the policy change and the term ( ) ( ) 111111 11 adffba +++=H . The 
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aggregate welfare change measures additional benefits that accrue to the economy as a result 
of the policy change. The parallel supply shift presented in Figure 2 represents a 
simplification; in reality, shifts in supply could also be convergent or divergent. The 
circumstances under which supply shifts can be divergent or convergent and methods for 
estimating the resulting benefits are well explained by Lindner and Jarrett (1978).
5.2 Application to Kenyan milk markets
5.2.1 Price response to policy change
The model in Figure 2 postulates that, at least in the short run, reduced transaction costs 
deriving from legalized trading after training and licensing would lead to an increase in farm 
price and a decrease in retail price, thus resulting in reduced market margins. In Figure 3, we 
present trends in market margins, measured as the difference between real urban wholesale 
prices (using the consumer price index and 2006 as the base year) for unprocessed milk 
and processed milk in Nairobi and Nakuru, to investigate evidence of this phenomenon and 
determine if the beginning of the phenomenon coincided with the date of the policy change. 
In the absence of data on retail prices for raw unpasteurized milk usually sold by SSMVs 
(the informal sector), we obtained prices paid for raw unpasteurized milk by large-scale milk 
processors (as a processing input) and the prices they received for processed, pasteurized 
milk usually sold in ‘high end’ markets or grocery stores. In reality, these prices would be 
different from actual farm gate and retail prices in informal markets which were specifically 
targeted by the policy change. However, the policy change may have similar effects although 
the magnitude of the change may differ because of inherent differences in price transmission 
and focus of the policy.
Source: Prices obtained from Kenya Dairy Development Project, August 2003 to July 2006. 
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We obtained weekly prices for large-scale milk processors from the Kenya Dairy 
Development Project, but due to non-reporting for some weeks, the need for uniformity 
ensured that we averaged over weeks reported in a month to obtain average monthly prices. 
In Nairobi there appeared to be no obvious changes in market margins around the period 
of the policy change (September 2004) or in subsequent months. However, in Nakuru there 
were pronounced changes in market margins, with the decline beginning after June 2004 and 
hitting a low point in November 2004. The trend continued through May 2005, after which 
market margins increased again to previous high levels. The decline in Nakuru commenced 
shortly after the SDP forum held in May 2004, at which it was made clear that there would 
be changes to the Kenyan dairy policy to encourage and formalize the activities of SSMVs. 
However, it must be noted that prices of unprocessed milk in Nakuru remained virtually 
unchanged during this period, hence the decrease in market margin is attributed to decrease 
in processed milk prices. Although this aspect was not thoroughly investigated, the decline in 
processed milk prices in Nakuru may have been due to competition from newly (or soon to 
be) formalized SSMVs, who could (after September 2004) legally sell raw, unpasteurized milk 
in the retail market (under conditions previously outlined).
Intuitively, price changes depend on nominal demand in cases where there are no supply 
shocks. Nominal demand for milk in the then formal sector (large-scale processors including 
KCC) could not have been significantly influenced by the revised dairy policy, hence the 
price changes, if any, were not dramatic. Note the difference in commodity and the influence 
of a dedicated market: SSMVs sell raw milk at ubiquitous retail market locations, whereas 
large-scale processors sell processed milk to the high end market, largely in grocery stores. 
In addition, it is simply true that if there were any direct policy effects on milk prices, it is 
unlikely that price transmission mechanisms were that well developed to easily and quickly 
transmit the effects especially through the formal sector which served a dedicated market.
We note that results from this analysis were obtained from the formal sector and this does not 
necessarily reflect what is happening in the informal sector which is covered in our surveys 
of SSMVs. In later sections, it will emerge that significant reductions in transaction costs 
were achieved in some areas in the informal milk sector, following the implementation of the 
revised policy.
There are other policy outcomes that could have different effects on farm and retail prices. 
For example, theoretical constructs suggest that increased entry into the market by SSMVs 
would lead to an increase in milk supply and hence reduced farm prices. When milk 
promotion is added, retail prices increase following increased consumer demand. However, 
it is clear that in Kenya, promotion has not necessarily increased demand but has seen 
consumers shift preferences from milk sales/purchase outlets to quality-assured branded milk 
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bars. Anecdotal evidence of this was provided by KDB staff (personal communication, 28 
June 2007):
Milk sales in one location increased from 200 to 5000 litres per week, following 
branding and consumer promotion. Consumer promotion activities focus on 
enabling the consumer to focus on what to buy/look for and where to buy it.
Note that a branded outlet/milk bar usually meets all other quality and certification 
requirements.
5.2.2 Policy impact and changes in market margin
The average SSMV conducts several transactions in the milk sales business. Those 
transactions that may not have changed with the new policy include transportation, cess, 
market place tax and the number of containers used. Those that may have changed with 
the new policy include the type of containers used, payment of illegal contingency fees or 
political rent, milk and container loss due to confiscation, milk preservation and quality 
control, and training and licensing. 
Economic theory allows us to measure market margin between two points or agents 
in the market chain using at least two approaches; one allows for a categorization and 
summation of all transaction costs between the two points or agents, and the other allows 
us to measure market margin as the difference between the two prices at those points. It is 
difficult to accurately identify and account for all relevant transaction costs. Therefore, this 
study expressed transaction costs in terms of retail-farm price margins. Results for daily milk 
purchases and prices are summarized by location and trader type in Table 4. Ideally, one 
would use actual prices paid and received instead of using recall information as was done in 
this study due to the difficulty of obtaining such information.
Prices paid and received were highest at milk bars both before and after the policy change. 
As previously mentioned, the study used September 2004 as the policy change date and 
asked SSMVs to recall transactions in the immediate pre-policy change days and then 
compare those to similar transactions in August 2007.
In Nairobi, the highest margins accrued to non-producer mobile traders both before and 
after the policy change, whereas in Nakuru the highest margins accrued to producer mobile 
traders. When averaged over SSMVs in Nairobi, there was a KES 0.80 per litre decline in 
margin that may be attributed to the new policy’s effect of reducing market margins. On the 
other hand, in Nakuru, the decline in margin attributed to the impact of the new policy was 
only KES 0.27 per litre, consistent with earlier findings and indicating that the new policy 
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appeared to have a less discernible effect on the prices of unprocessed milk in Nakuru. In 
Nairobi, gains in margins resulting from the new policy were highest among non-producer 
mobile traders, followed by milk bars and mobile transporters, reflecting the fact that 
producer traders have not handled retail sales activities as those that focus primarily on 
trading activities.
Table 4. Average daily prices of milk and market margins before and after the policy change
Type of business
Nairobi price (KES/litre) Nakuru price (KES/litre)
Purchase Sale Margin Purchase Sale Margin
Before policy change 
Mobile trader (producer) 14.27 19.53 5.26 13.00 20.77 7.77
Mobile trader (non-producer) 15.40 23.80 8.40 14.17 19.00 4.83
Transporter trader 14.43 20.57 6.14 16.50 20.00 3.50
Milk bar 18.43 24.43 6.00 17.60 23.60 6.00
Average for all SSMVs 15.35 21.48 6.13 14.42 20.85 6.42
After policy change
Mobile trader (producer) 15.20 20.53 5.33 14.86 22.14 7.28
Mobile trader (non-producer) 16.60 23.60 7.00 14.50 19.50 5.00
Transporter trader 16.14 21.00 4.86 17.50 21.50 4.00
Milk bar 20.67 25.33 4.66 19.40 24.60 5.20
Average for all SSMVs 16.60 21.93 5.33 15.81 21.96 6.15
Reduction in margin attributed to policy 
change, for Nairobi and Nakuru
0.80 0.27
Mann–Whitney test statistics (before vs. 
after) 
Z=1.36; p=0.087 Z=0.85; p=0.1977
Average margin over all locations and trader types, before policy change 6.26
Average margin over all locations and trader types, after policy change 5.72
Overall average reduction in margin attributed to policy change 0.54
Source: Survey data (2007).
The study used tests of statistical significance to determine whether margins significantly 
declined following the implementation of the new policy. A t-test confirmed that for the 
combined data (i.e. Nairobi and Nakuru) comparing margins before and after policy change, 
there was no statistically significant difference (t = 1.16; p = 0.1256). However, when Mann 
Whitney tests were performed for the Nairobi dataset alone, the average margin of KES 6.13/
litre before policy change was found to be statistically higher than the average post-policy 
change margin of KES 5.33/litre, albeit only at 10% probability level (Z = 1.36; p = 0.087). 
Tests for Nakuru revealed that post-policy change margins were not statistically different 
from pre-policy change margins. Consequently, the study estimated separate measurements 
of welfare for Nairobi (using Nairobi margins and production/supply information) and 
economy-wide using average country-wide margins, which were not weighted because 
weighting would grossly underestimate resultant welfare measures.
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Information obtained from the above analysis of market margins in the Kenyan milk 
sector showed that policy-change effects on margin were more evident in Nairobi than 
elsewhere in the country. Policy-change institutions such as KDB and BDS providers 
are more likely to be visible, active and effective in Nairobi and its environs. Indeed, 
while training and licensing have been on-going activities within the mandates of 
KDB and BDS providers, the number of trainers has not increased in proportion to the 
increasing number of SSMVs who wish to be trained. According to KDB staff (personal 
communication, 28 June 2007):
One hundred SSMVs are now being trained per week and the total number of 
BDS-trained SSMVs had risen to 3000. In addition, plans were underway by 
KDB to increase the number of BDS providers country-wide from 31 to 50.
Averaged over all locations and SSMVs, the study found a KES 0.54 per litre reduction in 
margin, equivalent to approximately 9% of the pre-policy change margin. Although the 
overall reduction in margin (averaged over locations and SSMVs) appears small, Figure 
4 shows more than a fourfold increase in quantities purchased and sold in Nairobi in 
the period after the policy change and more than a threefold increase over all locations. 
Evidently, SSMVs operate in a small margin market in which profit is realized from increased 
volume quick turnovers. While the decline in mar ket margin may also have been affected 
over time by other factors such as fuel costs, the simplified frame work applied here assumes 
that such cost changes are minimal and hence attributes all margin reductions to the policy 
change.
The increase in quantities purchased and sold by SSMVs is not unusual, given that SSMV 
activities in scheduled urban areas like Nairobi were previously proscribed and therefore 
conducted under unfavourable conditions. Allowing licensed SSMVs to operate freely in an 
environment with high demand for raw milk (see high annual per capita milk consumption 
of 145 litres in 2005) leads to increased milk supply to the retail market. In addition, 
approximately 45% of the SSMVs interviewed were licensed milk bar owners and daily 
throughput at milk bars serving an urban retail market could be much higher than, say, 
mobile bicycle traders. Still, the increased figures mentioned do not necessarily reflect 
evidence of higher market share to SSMVs; rather they reflect the ability to now conduct 
marketing activities freely, aided by increasing demand. While annual statistics for milk 
intake into the formal sector are readily available, those for the informal sector are not, hence 
the use of recall information. Milk intake into the formal sector in 2004 was highest in June 
(at 28.2 million litres); thereafter it started declining through its lowest point in October (18.7 
million litres) after which it started increasing again. In 2005, average milk intake into the 
formal sector increased by 23% over 2004.
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Source: Survey data (2007). 
Figure 4. Average daily quantities of milk purchased and sold by SSMVs before and after the policy change.
5.2.3 Welfare changes attributed to policy change
We used the economic model outlined in Section 5.1 to estimate changes in surpluses 
that accrue to consumers, farmers, SSMVs and input suppliers, and then compared the 
aggregate of these changes to project costs in order to also estimate the profitability of a 
POR project: the SDP. In its optimal form, the model is expressed in terms of parameters 
of retail demand, farm supply and marketer schedules, together with cost changes 
resulting from policy change. In the absence of survey data typically used to estimate these 
schedules, we used values presented in Table 5 (and sources) to estimate the parameters for 



















Purchased Sold Purchased Sold Purchased Sold
Nairobi/Thika Nakuru All locations
Before policy change After policy change
Quantity of milk (litres)
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Table 5. Variables for estimating economy-wide welfare changes attributed to the new dairy policy
Variable description Symbol Value Source of information 
Raw milk production Q 4.02 billion litres SDP Policy Brief 10 (2005)
Retail price Pr KES 21.57/litre Study survey (averaged over all 
locations and SSMV sales)
Farm price Pf KES 15.58/litre Study survey (averaged over all 
locations and SSMV purchases)
Non-market input cost per unit of 
output
Pn KES 7.06/litre Estimated using data from Salasya 
et al. (2006) and updated SDP 
milk production data
Elasticity of milk demand at retail εr –0.97 Salasya et al. (2006)
Elasticity of milk supply at farm ef 0.35 Salasya et al. (2006)
Elasticity of marketing services 
supply
em 2 Freebairn et al. (1982)
Cost reduction due to changes in 
transaction costs and elimination 
of non-tariff trade barriers
w KES 0.54/litre Study survey, decrease in retail 
farm price margin (comparing 
before and after policy change) 
ξ KES 0.85/litre Study survey, estimated at 10% of 
value added, i.e. (Pf – Pn)
ψ KES 0.71/litre Estimated at 10% of Pn 
Table 6. Variables used in estimating welfare changes attributed to the new dairy policy in the 
Nairobi area
Variable description Symbol Value Source of information 
Raw milk production Q 493 million litres Assuming supply clears the market, estimated 
from SDP data showing annual per capita 
milk consumption at 145 litres and Nairobi 
population at 3.4 million in 2005
Retail price Pr KES 21.70/litre Study survey (averaged over all locations and 
SSMV sales)
Farm price Pf KES 15.97/litre Study survey (averaged over all locations and 
SSMV purchases)
Non-market input cost  
per unit of output
Pn KES 6.90/litre Estimated using data from Salasya et al. 
(2006) and updated SDP milk production 
data
Elasticity of milk demand 
at retail
εr –0.97 Salasya et al. (2006)
Elasticity of milk supply  
at farm
ef 0.35 Salasya et al. (2006)
Elasticity of marketing  
services supply 
em 2 Freebairn et al. (1982)
Cost reduction due to 
changes in transaction 
costs and elimination of 
non-tariff trade barriers
w KES 0.80/litre Study survey, decrease in retail farm price 
margin (comparing before and after policy 
change) 
ξ KES 0.91/litre Study survey, estimated at 10% of value 
added, i.e. (Pf – Pn)
ψ KES 0.69/litre Estimated at 10% of Pn 
The data sources included a combination of SDP statistics, survey data and grey literature. 
We used SDP data for raw milk production in Kenya, updated in 2005 (SDP 2005). Farm 
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and retail prices were obtained from the surveys. Following Salasya et al. (2006), we used 
housing as a non-farm input and expressed the cost of housing obtained from that study 
(KES 1313 per month) per unit of raw milk produced per year. We also obtained own price 
elasticities of demand and supply from the same study. We found no comparable previous 
studies measuring elasticities of marketing services and marketing inputs, but Freebairn et al. 
(1982) mentioned evidence of highly elastic long-run supply curves, thus using a value of 2 
or ∞ for illustrative purposes. To use these elasticity measures, the usual caveat of assuming 
homogeneous preferences among consumers, farmers, SSMVs and input suppliers applies.
Estimates of cost reductions in the market margin due to the policy change include KES 0.54 
per litre to the milk vendor, KES 0.85 to the farmer (representing 10% of the farmer’s gross 
margin) and KES 0.71 per litre to the input supplier (corresponding to 10% of the cost of 
non-farm input per unit farm output). The Nairobi area model used the same information on 
elasticities of milk demand, farm-level milk supply and supply of marketing services as did 
the country-wide analysis. However, data on milk production, retail and farm-level prices, 
and non-farm input costs as well as cost reductions attributed to policy changes differed. 
In the models under consideration, aggregate gains are known to be proportional to cost 
reductions but elasticities have minimal effects, except in terms of distributions. Simulation 
results are presented in Table 7 for the economy-wide and Nairobi area models.
Table 7. Distribution of gains from the policy change
Change in benefits (KES × 106)
Scenarios
Cost reductions only occur at 
the level of the SSMV  
(i.e. ξ=ψ=0) 
Cost reductions occur  
at all levels 
Economy-wide 
(I)






Benefits to consumers 520.84 95.01 2040.48 287.09
Benefits to producers 1042.62 193.78 4084.64 585.56
Benefits to SSMVs 280.60 48.67 1099.29 147.07
Benefits to input suppliers 330.82 58.63 1296.06 177.18
Total benefits 2174.87 396.09 8520.46 1196.91
Annual expenditure on SDP 
(1997–2004)
40.63 40.63 40.63 40.63
Annual costs of training and licens-
ing (2005–39)
864.00 864.00* 864.00 864.00*
*Note that these are countrywide costs and are only being applied to the Nairobi scenario in totality for the sake 
of expediency.
Table 7 presents estimates of how much the dairy sector is contributing to the Kenyan 
economy. When the effect of the policy change is assumed to reduce transaction costs at the 
SSMV level alone, total benefits accruing to the sector are estimated at KES 2.17 billion per 
annum. There is a fourfold increase in total benefits to KES 8.52 billion per annum when the 
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policy change is modelled to also reduce farmer and input supplier-related costs. Clearly, 
more than 70% of the benefits accrue to producers and consumers, and less than 30% to 
SSMVs and input suppliers. As earlier observed, SSMVs and input suppliers operate in a small 
margin environment, and this could account for their smaller share of total benefits. Gains 
realized by SSMVs and input suppliers come from higher sales alone.
When cost reductions resulting from policy change occur only at the level of SSMVs, 
Nairobi area welfare gains account for approximately 18% of the economy-wide gains, and 
nearly 14% of economy-wide welfare gains when cost reductions occur at all levels. With a 
potential consumer base of nearly 3.4 million (or 10% of Kenya’s total population), Nairobi 
area welfare gains are sufficiently high to justify the efforts to date on training and licensing 
and suggest the level of potential benefits to further investment in these activities. However, 
when the total costs of training and licensing (country-wide costs) are accounted for, scenario 
II (Nairobi area when benefits accrue only to SSMVs) is not cost-effective.
The NPV of the stream of net benefits was calculated for the economy-wide model. We 
assumed that research costs (USD 5 million) were equally spread over the first eight years, 
corresponding to the life of the project and ending with the year 2004 when the policy 
change was effected; total DFID funding for SDP was USD 2.5 million over an eight-year 
period, plus an estimated USD 2.5 million from in-kind contribution by SDP partners. 
Benefits were assumed to start accruing in year 2005 and, for the purpose of this analysis, 
to the year 2039. However, in the year when benefits start accruing, we impute additional 
costs of training and licensing of SSMVs (as estimated above) amounting to KES 864 million 
per year as follows (see ILRI, undated, for cost estimates): because the system was designed 
to be sustainable, costs of training and certification would be borne by SSMVs. Based on 
discussions with KDB officials, we estimated that 50 BDS providers (the target figure for 
KDB) would train approximately 160 SSMVs per week. SSMVs pay KES 1000 for training 
(KES 8.3 million per year). Trained SSMVs pay a one-time licence fee of KES 3500 (KES 
29.12 million per year). SSMVs pay cess fees to KDB at KES 0.20 per litre (KES 803.17 
million per year). The cess fee is a tax collected by the KDB, which should technically 
be collected at the farm level. However, because small-scale producers are not easily 
tracked (unlike large producers), KDB officials have routinely opted to collect cess fees at 
bulking and collection points, where SSMVs operate. This adds a tax burden to SSMVs. 
Finally, SSMVs pay other statutory costs—including municipal/council fees, commerce 
fees and health inspection fees—amounting to KES 2811 (KES 23.39 million per year). 
We use interest rates of 1.99% (real interest rate in Kenya; base year 2007), 5% and 15%, 
the higher rate to account for inherent risks in some projects. Results of the analysis are 
presented in Table 8.
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Table 8. Cost–benefit analysis of the new policy for all scenarios
Years
Scenarios 
I II III IV
Annual cost 1997–2004 40.63 40.63 40.63 40.63
2005–39 864.00 864.00 864.00 864.00
Annual benefit 1997–2004 0 0 0 0





















Costs and benefits in million KES. 
Note: Scenario II is not profitable.
The analysis shows that even in the case where cost reductions only occur at the SSMV level, 
SDP costs are easily recouped, the NPV being greater than zero under all three interest rate 
scenarios. Logically, as interest rates increase, NPV would decline. 
Under the above mentioned scenarios, the interest or discount rate would have to exceed 
55% for scenario I, 92% for scenario III and 32% for scenario IV for the NPV of the policy 
research investment to fall below zero (also equivalent to the IRR). This project would be 
worthwhile until the cost of capital exceeds the IRR identified under each scenario. Under 
the assumptions used, scenario II is not beneficial because costs exceed benefits, although 
the costs are country-wide applied to a Nairobi area scenario. However, annual benefits 
to SSMVs from the policy change of KES 280.60 million (in Scenario I, but not in Scenario 
III) fall far below the estimated total annual costs of fees, training etc. of KES 864 million. 
Hence if a significant portion of these costs, especially cess fees, are assessed at SSMVs levels 
(where cost reductions only occur at SSMV levels), SSMVs would be worse off as a result of 
the policy change, which is contrary to what was intended by SDP and advocacy partners. 
This raises questions about the appropriateness of the cost-sharing arrangements in the 
implementation of the regulatory changes.
We re-estimated welfare benefits of the POR using new estimates of margin reduction 
derived by Salasya et al. (2006) who estimated margin change as 38% of the pre policy 
change marketing margin which, based on estimates in our study, amounts to KES 2.38 per 
litre. As previously explained, the model is highly sensitive to changes in cost reductions. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that when costs are reduced at the SSMV level alone, total 
benefits resulting from the margin change were estimated at KES 9.64 billion and when cost 
reductions occur for all actors, new total benefits are estimated at KES 16.11 billion. These 
large differences in welfare benefits reaffirm the need to precisely estimate marketing margin 
changes that are attributed to the revised policy.
35
5.3 Creating a counterfactual and attributing policy impact
POR benefits in this case study began to be realized in the ninth year following the launch 
of SDP (Table 8). When policymakers and researchers were asked how long it would have 
taken for the policy change to occur without SDP, their responses were revealing. The former 
SDP Project Manager stated that without the project, the following scenario would have been 
witnessed: 
At this time (January 2008), the SSMVs would still be in the milk business, but 
perhaps fewer of them [and] probably incurring higher transaction costs than 
before. This is because their existence is a response to milk demand, and the 
high transaction costs arise mainly due [to] costs of ensuring that they are not 
arrested and their containers and milk confiscated.
On how long it would have taken for SSMVs to be engaged by regulatory bodies, the Project 
Manager said:
Perhaps never, or until some SDP type of industry players with similar resources 
and capacity, or better, get involved in the Kenya dairy industry. Still, there 
would have been some engagement of SSMVs if there was reasonable pressure 
from the market for regulators to do so. It took almost SDP’s lifetime to review 
the Kenya dairy policy and engage SSMVs despite the fact that SDP was 
interacting/working with most of the dairy industry regulators, many of whom 
served in steering/policy level committees. It would have taken approximately 
20 years for SSMVs to be engaged by the regulatory bodies.
Another respondent, a senior researcher with excellent knowledge of SDP responded thus to 
the questions raised above (22 January 2008):
In my opinion, some changes would still have occurred given the strong vested 
interests in the dairy sector in Kenya and the debate that was raging over the 
issues, but the direction the changes would have taken would be uncertain 
and ill-informed. The changes could also have solely depended on the relative 
strengths of entrenched political forces vs. SSMVs. The SSMVs would have 
continued to be ignored or harassed for a number of years until such a time 
that their voices were able to counter those entrenched in the dairy industry. 
The impacts thereof can only be speculative. The most important contribution 
that SDP made was to provide the evidence, which in the end catalysed, 
speeded up and swayed the debate in one direction and allowing well-informed 
interventions to be initiated.
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The last sentence in the paragraph above was echoed by KDB, in input they provided to a 
dairy development document, when they were faced with similar questions on the impact 
of SDP (Source: Dairy policy in practice: a study of grassroots attitudes and behaviour in the 
Kenyan informal dairy sector). 
The key drivers in KDB policy change process are as follows:
Release of credible research information by the MoLFD/KARI/ILRI  •	
Smallholder Dairy Project.
Restructuring of KDB operations funded by FAO that involved staff •	
rationalization, recruitment of qualified staff and capacity building.
Engagement in collaborative projects aimed at improving small-scale  •	
milk marketing, mainly focusing on testing a quality assurance approach 
involving training (based on standardized training requirements) and 
certification of small-scale milk traders.
Development of the first strategic plan with clear goals and activities.•	
The creation of dairy regulatory forums with representatives of key  •	
stakeholders at all levels.
Review of regulations within the current dairy policy framework.•	
Engagement in the process of harmonization of regional dairy  •	
policies, regulations, training and quality assurance standards.
These opinions and document support the notion that SDP played a pivotal role in effecting 
policy change. SDP accelerated a process and achieved an outcome that may have come 
many years later. Of course, SDP research and policy advocacy were collaboratively carried 
out by several institutions, including ILRI, KARI and MoLFD. Attributing the benefits of 
policy change in a multi-institution effort is not a marginal exercise. First, the policy change 
is technically still in process, both with regards to final parliamentary passage of the main 
regulation and implementation of current training and licensing activities as envisioned in the 
policy. Consequently, the problem of attribution is compounded by an outcome that is yet 
unclear and not easily measurable quantitatively. The CGIAR Science Council commissioned 
a scoping study which articulated this problem (CGIAR Science Council 2006). Second, the 
policymaker MoLFD was one of the major institutions involved in the process, playing a key 
role in advocating for policy change, hence attribution would be difficult.
Finally, to present a measure of economic impacts without SDP, we present estimates of 
NPV assuming that the Kenya policy review and legalization of SSMVs would have been 
delayed by 20 years without SDP (based on responses from SDP Project Manager) and by a 
more conservative estimate of 10 years, with benefit streams extrapolated through 2039. A 
simplified additional assumption is that there is no additional investment or benefits until the 
year in which legalization would occur (i.e. 2015 or 2025). The differences in NPV with and 
without SDP are presented in Table 9.
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Table 9. Differences in NPV with and without SDP, for scenarios I, III and IV
Time delay Interest rate  (%)
NPV 
(without SDP)  
(KES × 106)
Difference in NPV 
(with SDP –  
without SDP)  
(KES × 106)
Scenario I


























10 years late: legalization occurs in 2014. 
20 years late: legalization occurs in 2025.
NPV continues to be positive even as legalization is postponed beyond 2004 when SDP 
influenced policy change (Table 9). In addition, the directly attributable impacts of SDP 
are also positive, as measured by the differences in outcomes with and without the project, 
suggesting that legalization resulting from SDP advocacy was beneficial.
The research and coordination efforts of SDP continue to contribute to the policy 
implementation phase, producing policy briefs, training manuals and sessions on milk 
handling and quality control. These research efforts have also contributed empirical evidence 
supporting the harmonization of dairy policy regulations across East Africa. Lessons learned 
in terms of ILRI’s success in getting empirical evidence to inform dairy policy changes are 
highlighted in a study by Leksmono et al. (2006) on the role of research in pro-poor dairy 
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policy shift in Kenya. They include: (1) good collaboration between the SDP institutions was 
a key contributor to the success of SDP in achieving policy change; (2) SDP research was 
rigorous and by the time the advocacy phase came along, SDP had obtained a set of highly 
technical and pertinent research results; (3) SDP was particularly effective in achieving policy 
change because it started as a research and development project and (4) farmers and SSMVs 
were empowered by SDP to speak out on issues affecting the sector, and this was a most 
compelling factor in changing opinions of decision-makers at the May 2004 policy forum. 
Currently, the Kenyan dairy sector is liberalized and moving ahead with plans to train and 
license SSMVs to become fully engaged in the formal sector. The revision of the Kenyan dairy 
policy to reflect engagement with SSMVs in the formal sector is still in parliamentary process. 
However, significant progress has been made and Kenya now leads a noteworthy regional 
effort to harmonize dairy policies and liberalize trade in dairy products among countries in 
East Africa. In neighbouring countries like Tanzania and Uganda where there have been no 
SDP-like activity, policy change has been carried out at a slower rate than in Kenya, hence 
the process of policy harmonization in the region is helping to speed it up.
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6 Summary and conclusion
The research aimed at informing and changing dairy policy in Kenya analysed here was part 
of a larger, multi-partner project effort called SDP. Linking research with policy action is 
challenging, and it can be argued that much POR does not succeed. Thus a look backwards 
at just how policy processes were influenced by these research efforts is a useful learning 
exercise for informing future similar efforts, as are efforts to better understand and quantify, 
where possible, the impacts of such POR efforts.
This study built upon and benefited from a recent analysis of processes of policy change in 
the Kenya dairy sector, that included where and how research results informed these changes 
and who used them. We complemented these ‘process’ lessons with an ex post economic 
analysis of actual benefits (as best they can be estimated) and costs of the SDP policy-related 
efforts.
We found that SDP produced a significant volume of evidence that was used to influence 
the policy change process at various stages by different decision-makers and organizations. 
Although the Kenyan dairy policy document and bill have been in parliamentary process 
for more than a decade, written ministerial subsidiary regulation and KDB reorganization 
provide ample regulatory authority for engaging SSMVs, and this significant shift in dairy 
regulation was traced back to September 2004. The study found significant evidence of 
behavioural change among regulators and SSMVs that has led to positive economic benefits 
across Kenya.
The impact of the new policy on market margins appears trivial when data are pooled across 
locations. However, it emerged that margins in Nairobi were significantly different from 
margins in Nakuru. When independently assessed, it is shown that policy impacts in Nairobi 
led to significantly lower margins in the post policy change environment. Still, increased 
market quantities were observed in both Nairobi and Nakuru in the post policy change 
environment. Thus, SSMVs—particularly those operating in Nakuru—derive profits from 
quick relatively high volume turnovers and as a result, welfare benefits accruing to SSMVs 
increased.
Welfare benefits arising from the policy change were high, and were also captured by 
consumers (through lower milk prices) and producers. A cost–benefit analysis revealed that 
the policy change was highly profitable with a high positive NPV. In addition, the very high 
IRR value suggests that positive net benefits will continue to be gained by many actors in the 
dairy sector for years to come. However, government must devise a fairer way of distributing 
the cost of cess among consumers, producers, and SSMVs, rather than assessing a significant 
portion at the level of SSMVs.
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The choice of sampling, sample size and interview approach were cursory and designed to 
ensure that we quickly quantified marketing margin for SSMVs, believing that there would be 
marginal need for statistical hypothesis testing. While we do not believe that our estimates 
were consequently compromised, it is now obvious that a more formalized approach would 
especially aid the comparison of marketing margins, before and after revision of the Kenyan 
dairy policy, as well as between Nairobi and Nakuru.
Future analysis could focus on significant wastage reduction and how this can be handled in 
the modelling exercise. For example, if SDP research leads to significant gains from reduced 
milk losses, merely using net change in the marketing services margin as the cost change 
tends to net out this effect. If the impact is significant, this framework may not be appropriate 
because farmers tend to lose from this type of research due to a reduction in farm gate price 
unless the final demand is very elastic or other costs in the supply chain are significantly 
reduced. This may not be the case in the current assessment because of significant payment 
of political rent to avoid seizures as well as significant sales activity in rural areas where 
enforcement was more lax.
Additional analysis could present a completely disaggregated model, with one for Nairobi 
and other urban areas where margins are probably significantly lessened by the revised 
policy, and another for rural areas where milk consumption is closer to the point of 
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Appendix 2 Questionnaire for regulators/street-level bureaucrats 
Experiences and changes with respect to enforcement of new milk handling and quality 
control procedures obtained through training  
1. Please describe your current enforcement activities with respect to milk handling and 





2. Have your enforcement duties/activities changed in the last five years? Code [ _________ ]  
[1 = YES; 2 = NO]





4. When were you asked to start doing enforcement activities/duties differently than you 










6. Who gave instructions for you to start doing enforcement duties/activities differently? 
________________________________________________________________________________
7. Have you followed these instructions strictly? Code [ _________ ] [1 = YES; 2 = NO]
47
8. If NO, why? ___________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
9. Did you undergo training on how to enforce milk handling and quality control 
requirements? Code [______] [1 = YES; 2 = NO]
10. If YES, when? _________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
11. Have trained and licensed milk traders strictly followed the new requirements on milk 
handling and quality control? Code [______] [1 = YES; 2 = NO]
12. If NO, what is the most common violation? _______________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
13. What punishments have you meted to those who violate the regulations? ______________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________




15. Are you currently less strict in enforcement of regulations on milk traders who are NOT 




16. Do you think there are (other) enforcers who used to or currently demand political rent 
(bribes) from milk traders? _________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________





Appendix 3 Checklist for KDB officials 
1. What did the ‘enforcers’ of the old Kenya dairy policy do before the policy change? 
(Describe their enforcement jobs/activities at the time).
2. What are they doing now?
3. Why did they make the changes they did?
4. Who told them to stop harassing small-scale milk vendors, stop demanding political 
rent or stop enforcing the old Kenyan dairy policy rules/regulations?
5. Exactly when were they told to stop harassing small-scale milk vendors, stop 
demanding political rent or stop enforcing the old Kenyan dairy policy rules/
regulations?
6. Small-scale vendors who underwent training in hygiene and milk handling were 
licensed to sell milk and thus, clearly, were no longer harassed.
What proportion of all small-scale milk vendors do the trained vendors •	
comprise?
Are the untrained small-scale milk vendors also escaping harassment now?•	
7. How can we be persuaded that the policy change happened because of research and 
not because of a government change (end of Moi government) or some other factor?
8. If possible can KBD provide data on:
Milk production or off-take from 2000 through 2005 or up till now?•	
Number of small-scale milk vendors?•	
Influence pathways and economic 
impacts of policy change in the Kenyan 
dairy sector
ILRI
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